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Abstract There is general consensus that carbon (C) sequestration projects in forests are a
relatively low cost option for mitigating climate change, but most studies on the subject have
assumed that transaction costs are negligible. The objectives of the study were to examine
transaction costs for forest C sequestration projects and to determine the significance of the
costs based on economic analyses. Here we examine four case studies of active C sequestra-
tion projects being implemented in tropical countries and developed for the C market. The
results from the case studies were then used with a dynamic forest and land use economic
model to investigate how transaction costs affect the efficiency and cost of forest C projects
globally. In the case studies transaction costs ranged from 0.38 to 27 million US dollars
($0.09 to $7.71/t CO2) or 0.3 to 270 % of anticipated income depending principally on the
price of C and project size. The three largest cost categories were insurance (under the
voluntary market; 41–89 % of total costs), monitoring (3–42 %) and regulatory approval
(8–50 %). The global analysis indicated that most existing estimates of marginal costs of C
sequestration are underestimated by up to 30 % because transaction costs were not included.
Keywords Climate change . Carbon projects . Forest carbon .Mitigation . Transaction costs
1 Introduction
There are a number of analyses that suggest that C sequestration in forests is a relatively low
cost option for mitigating climate change (see Nabuurs et al. 2007 for a review). However,
most of the studies done to date have assumed that transaction costs, which include search
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costs, learning costs, legal costs, bargaining costs, and other costs incurred when two parties
trade with each other, are small to negligible. If transaction costs are substantive, many forest
C sequestration projects may no longer be cost-effective. While transaction costs have been
widely discussed as having potentially important implications for climate change policy, and
in particular, for policies related to reduction of C emissions and to C sequestration in
forests, few published studies have assessed their implications on the costs of C
sequestration.
The literature on transaction costs and C offsets is limited principally because the market
is still developing, and costs experienced by projects 10 or even 5 years ago are not
representative of costs faced today. In addition, the earliest projects faced early-actor
penalties in that these projects were obliged to learn lessons and make mistakes upon which
the subsequently developing market has been based. The analysis of Antinori and Sathaye
(2007) illustrates this issue. The first Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) forestry
project was only registered at the end of 2006 (the second did not follow until 2009). The
first Climate Action Reserve (CAR) projects were registered at the end of 2007 while the
Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and the American Carbon Registry (ACR) had no forest
projects until late in 2009. This early project bias is certainly reflected in the resulting costs.
For example, feasibility studies in Antinori and Sathaye (2007) represent 19 % of total
transaction costs while regulatory approval represented just 1 %. This is contrary to what we
expect in a mature C project market.
Because there is limited evidence on the size of transaction costs in forest-based projects,
few economic analyses have attempted to incorporate these costs. One exception is Cacho et al.
(2005), who developed an analysis that incorporated transactions costs, but theirstudy did not
actually estimate these costs. Another study by Cacho and Lipper (2007) developed a model of
transaction costs and incorporated estimates directly into their sequestration analysis. However,
they pointed out that their underlying transaction cost estimates actually were arbitrary and not
based on quantitative estimates from the field. Given the paucity of work in this area, it is likely
that most cost estimates of C sequestration projects (e.g., those reviewed in Richards and Stokes
2004 and Sohngen 2010) have underestimated the transaction costs of such projects. The extent
of the underestimation will depend in part on the magnitude of the transaction cost, but it also
will depend on how transaction costs are implemented in economic models. Antinori and
Sathaye (2007) for example, suggested that transaction costs are relatively fixed, so that if they
are spread over a larger quantity of C, they will have a small impact on any unit of C
sequestration. This assumption is likely true for certain components of transaction costs, but
it may not be adequate for other components. Insurance costs, for instance, likely vary in direct
proportion to the value of C at risk, as opposed to the project volume of C. And, if C prices are
rising, insurance costs will also rise. It is important to implement transaction costs correctly in
economic models to assess their effect.
The objectives of this study were to determine the contribution of transaction costs to
total costs incurred by forest C sequestration projects. This was achieved through a study of
four case studies across two project categories in three geographical regions. The case study
costs were then fed into a dynamic forest and land use model to demonstrate the implication
of transaction costs globally..
1.1 Definition of transaction costs
Transaction costs for the purposes of this study are defined as “the resources used to define,
establish, maintain and transfer property rights” (McCann et al. 2005). For Cmarkets this can be
phrased as “the financial cost to define, establish, maintain and transfer C credits.” Following
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the categorization proposed by Antinori and Sathaye (2007), we compiled transaction costs into
six categories (Table 1). These categories include a) initial costs, which will be applied to the
project only once, i.e. search costs, feasibility assessment, and negotiation; b) monitoring costs
Table 1 Categorization of transaction costs in this paper and in comparison to the original categorization by
Antinori and Sathaye (2007)
Transaction cost
category
Antinori and Sathaye (2007) definition Cost category includes these elements
in this paper
Search costs • Identifying and selecting the project,
project partners and consultants
• Identifying project location
• Identifying project partners
• Identifying project consultants
Feasibility study costs • Full feasibility study that would include • Conduct feasibility study
○ a GHG baseline assessment and the
determination of its additionality
• Develop project idea note (PIN)
○ engineering, market, baseline and
environmental assessments
Negotiation costs • Obtaining permits, • Project marketing
• Arranging financing, and • ERPA contracts (emission reduction
purchase agreements)
• Negotiating emission reduction
purchase contracts.
• Contracts with individual landowners
that form part of the project
• Marketing and contracting for GHG
credits
• Contracts with national and/or regional
government as necessary
Monitoring costs • Preparation of a monitoring plan • Necessary measurements for baseline
determination and preparation of project
registration/listing document (e.g. CDM
Project Design Document (PDD))
• Continual monitoring and verification
of a project’s GHG savings.
• Measurements/monitoring for
determination of emission reductions/
sequestration benefits (every 1–5 years)
Regulatory approval
costs
• Validation cost incurred ex-ante to
confirm that the project is eligible
for claiming reductions
• Development of new methodology
(if necessary)
• Ex-post certification that credits are
produced and received
• Preparation of registration/listing
documents




• Project registration fees
• Verification costs
• Issuance fees
• Transfer fees of offsets to purchaser
Insurance costs • Project risk insurance • Project liability insurance
• Costs of insuring the emission
reductions
• Risk buffer/risk insurance
• Or self-insurance by portfolio
diversification, pooling projects,
or by adding a buffer “stock”
of carbon
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and regulatory approval costs, which will be applied to the project over time; and
c)insurance costs, which will depend on the value at risk.
An important issue in modeling or measuring transaction costs relates to the fixed nature of
many costs. For example, measuring and monitoring protocols may require some specific
pieces of equipment. Obviously, the more units of C over which the equipment can be used, the
lower the per unit cost of using the equipment will be. This suggests that larger projects may
achieve some “economies of scale” with respect to certain transaction cost categories. Cacho
and Lipper (2007), however, point out that not only is project size important, but the number of
actors is important. Projects that require fewer actors to sequester a given number of tons are
likely to have lower transaction costs. Their results, however, suggest that the band of costs
across differing number of actors is relativelymodest. They find that a 1,000 ha project with 625
actors would have transaction costs of $7.39 per ton CO2, while the same project size with only
200 actors would require transaction costs of $5.34 per ton CO2.
A related issue is that we would expect that transaction costs would fall over time as
participants become more familiar with the market. Many of the costs we examined here, such
as measuring and monitoring, regulatory approval, etc., may be difficult to accomplish at first.
But as individuals operating in the market gain experience with projects, they will be able to
accomplish many of these tasks at lower costs. Falconer et al. (2001) examined this issue,
finding that administration costs fell from around 50 % of the total costs at the beginning of the
program to around 15 % of the total costs by the sixth year of the program. Further, one would
expect that new technologies may emerge to lower the costs of accomplishing certain tasks. For
instance, new satellite technologies may emerge to greatly reduce the costs of measuring and
monitoring C in forests (Asner 2009; Brown et al. 2005).
Importantly, for our analysis we focus only on the transaction costs outlined in Table 1.
Other costs are included in the total cost calculation for the project but are not included as
transaction costs. These other costs include opportunity costs, or the foregone income as a
result of project implementation, and other project implementation costs, such as site
preparation and planting costs, the salaries for forest guards or the cost of the fossil fuels
used in managing the implemented activities. All of these are important costs, but they are
reflected in the direct costs of implementing the project.
2 Methods
2.1 The case studies
The four case studies represent a range of projects. Two of the case studies were located in East
Africa, one from South America, and one from South-East Asia. The project in South-East Asia
was a REDD (Reducing Emissions fromDeforestation and forest Degradation) project and was
at an earlier stage of development and so less complete data were available. The projects in
South America and East Africa were afforestation/reforestation (AR) projects and that at least
partially explain their more advanced status—methodologies have been available for account-
ing for AR projects for several years while the first REDD methodology was only approved in
September 2010.
One of the projects in East Africa has been developed for the Verified Carbon Standard
(VCS) and is located in a highland area with a long dry season and bi-modal rainfall and an
average temperature of 16 °C. The area is characterized by undulating land, with swampy valley
bottoms. Prior to the project, the area was a grassland. The project is planting exotic and native
tree species. The second AR project in East Africa, developed for the CDM, and is
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located in a lowland tropical area that was characterized as degraded shrub and
grassland prior to the project. The average temperature of the area is 30 °C. The
project in South America is located in the Amazon, with year round high temperatures
and precipitation, but with a notable 3 month dry season. The area is characterized by
undulating terraces with low gradient and impoverished acidic soils. Prior to the project
activities the area had been cleared of native forest cover and was a degraded pasture.
The project is planting native tree species. The project in SE Asia is a REDD project in
mature tropical humid evergreen and deciduous forests with an average elevation of
800 m. The area is threatened by road building and immigration principally for
plantation development and illegal timber harvest.
The projects ranged in area from 918 ha to over 300,000 ha (Table 2). The baseline for all
three AR projects was degraded grasslands/shrublands whereas the baseline land cover for
the REDD project wasa mature tropical humid forest. Three of the projects were using VCS
standards (http://v-c-s.org/) and one the CDM standard (http://cdm.unfccc.int/), and all
four were applying the Climate Community, and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) standards
(http://www.climate-standards.org/). The duration of the projects varied widely, from 20 to
99 years, and some are renewable after one or more contract periods.
2.2 Cost estimation and analyses
Data collection and interviews were conducted in October and November 2010 and the results
presented here reflect costs incurred and anticipated at that time. All three afforestation case
studies offer robust cost data from the ‘validation’ phase of the process. This is the phase
whereby the project achieves validation of its PDD by an appropriate third party
against a recognized standard. In the case of afforestation/reforestation projects most
often it does not make sense to proceed to the ‘verification’ of the C credit phase
until the trees reach a certain size whereby the amount of C sequestered is worth
measuring. Given the infancy of the forest C sector and its regulations, there were very
few projects that had moved beyond the ‘validation’ phase currently. However, as part of this
study through discussions about budgeting with the project developer, the costs of monitoring
and verification have also been included.
To estimate transaction costs over the project lifetime (corresponding to what is stated in
their respective PDDs) certain assumptions were made. Actual costs were used for all costs
incurred up until October 2010. These were broken down into the three categories as described
in section 1.1, and the project developers were asked to document costs per category and fill in a
spreadsheet documenting costs line by line—including all direct and indirect costs. Examples of
costs are staff salary, consulting fees, travel costs, and auditor costs. As far as possible project
developers were asked to provide evidence for these costs through the provision of invoices and
receipts. Future monitoring costs were estimated in line with the budgets developed by
project developers. For all projects it was assumed that verification would occur every 5 years
(as per the minimum requirement for CDM/VCS AR Projects). To calculate registry program
fees, the costs associated with the APX registry were applied. For the CDM East Africa project
no costs were applicable as the project falls into the ‘least developed country’ category, meaning
that registration and issuance costs are waived under the CDM standards.
All projects using the VCS standard must contribute a number of C credits to a buffer
based on an assessment of their risk of reversal (refer to the VCS standard documents at
http://v-c-s.org/program-documents/info for details). Projects under the CDM are issued
temporary credits that expire and can be reissued where stocks are shown to be present—this
is akin to a rental. Temporary credits have issues with fungibility and have been less attractive to
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buyers (Brown and Pearson 2009). The solution for the voluntary market was insurance
provided by the risk buffer allowing permanent and therefore fully fungible offsets.
To calculate the monetary value of the withholding amount for the risk buffer, a price of
$7.88/t CO2 was used (weighted average price per t CO2 provided in the 2009 Ecosystem
Marketplace Forest Carbon Markets report; (Hamilton et al 2009)). Of course this price may
well vary, and it is important to bear in mind that if the project is successful in maintaining
the forest C stock the risk buffer will be reduced through time, and withholdings released,
which can then be sold.
2.3 Integration with dynamic forest and land use model
To understand whether transaction costs will affect the efficiency of forestry C projects
requires the use of larger scale modeling. To accomplish this, we used the global land use
model in Sohngen and Mendelsohn (2003). The 2003 version of the model was linked to the
DICE (Dynamic Integrated Climate Economy) model (Nordhaus and Boyer 2000). A more
recent version of the model was developed and linked to a more recent version of the DICE
model (see Sohngen 2010) and this is the version used in our analysis. We incorporated
transaction cost estimates from the case studies into the economic model and assessed their
implications on the efficiency of C sequestration projects.
To analyze transaction costs we assumed that they drive a wedge between the market
price and the price that landowners see, as shown in Eq. (1):
PL ¼ PM  TC ð1Þ
In Eq. (1) PL is the price of C received by a landowner for tons of C sequestered, PM is the
price of C on the market, and TC is the transaction cost. The relationship between these prices,
transaction costs and supply functions (or marginal cost functions) for C sequestration are
shown in Fig. 1. S0 is the marginal cost of C supply that represents the landowners’ costs when
they implement C projects, including the costs of planting trees, the costs of fencing areas, and
the opportunity costs of land. This is the minimum amount of money landowners must receive
in order to participate in the project. The market supply curve, however, is actually located at S1.
S1represents the higher costs for actually supplying tons of C. The market supply curve












Fig. 1 Effect of transaction costs on markets. S0 is market supply of credits without transaction costs and S1 is
the market supply with transaction costs
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Most market studies do not include transaction costs, i.e., they assume TC=0, and thus
will assume that landowners obtain the market price of C. In Fig. 1, this is shown as P0. If
market studies do not consider transaction costs, they will estimate C supply of Q0. When
transaction costs are included in the analysis, the market supply function will shift upwards,
thereby raising all costs. In Fig. 1, we have shown that transaction costs on a per unit basis
increase as more C is sequestered (i.e., as Q increases) to represent the notion that transaction
costs might become larger if more value is at risk. This type of relationship between S0 and
S1 occurs if a transaction cost is a constant proportion of the price of C (e.g., 5 % of the C
price).
For this paper we assumed that transaction costs have two components, a fixed and variable
part. The fixed part reflects the costs of searching for and setting up a project, measuring
monitoring and verifying the project, and other components that will be the same no matter the
size of the project. We also assumed that a part of the payment relates to the costs associated
with insuring the tons of C in the project. Carbon tons in forest projects are at risk of loss due to
a range of factors, such as forest fires. The cost of insurance is assumed to be a fixed proportion
of the C price. In this case, transaction costs are given as
TC ¼ Aþ B  PM ð2Þ
where A represents fixed costs and B variable costs.
3 Results
3.1 Comparison of transaction costs among the case studies
Total transaction costs ranged from $26.6 million (all $ are 2010 USD) for the REDD project in
South-East Asia to $384,000 for the CDM afforestation project in East Africa (Table 3, Fig. 2).
On a per ton basis, costs ranged from $7.71/t CO2 (South America) to just $0.09/t CO2
(East Africa). On a per unit area basis the range of costs was from $89/ha (South-East Asia) to
$1,426/ha (South America).
For the VCS projects, insurance dominated the cost structure (41 % to 89 % of total costs)
due to the use of a risk buffer to address permanence. The only other categories exceeding
5 % of total transaction costs were monitoring (3–42 %) and regulatory approval costs
(8–50 %). Among the regulatory approval costs, registry fees dominated for the VCS projects
with large numbers of emission reductions (Fig. 3). As mentioned above, there were no fees for
the CDM project due to its least developed country location. Preparation of documents,
validation and verification represent costs encumbered by all projects. None of the projects,
however, had methodology costs as they all used existing approved methodologies and no
revisions were needed.
Over time, one expects that C prices will change to reflect increasing damages associated
with rising concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere (Nordhaus 2008). To get a sense for the
implications of transaction costs as C prices change, we estimated total transaction costs
across a range of offset prices (Table 4). Insurance costs, as noted above, had the largest
share of total costs, and including them ensures that transaction costs do not fall below 26 %
of projected income up to a C price of $30 per ton CO2 for any VCS project. Transaction
costs exceeded likely income for the South America project at offset prices of $2 and $4 per
ton CO2 (by 155 to 270 % of income). Transaction costs were low only for the CDM project
that lacked both insurance and registry costs.
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3.2 Effect of transaction costs on global C sequestration
We used Eq. 2 to estimate transaction costs in the global forest and land use model. In this
analysis, Awas assumed to equal $1 per ton CO2 and B was set to 0.23, or 23 % of the price.
Thus TC ¼ 1þ 0:23  PC . This equation for TC was then implemented in the model using
Eq. 1, whereby the price received by landowners is less than the price of C on the market.
Table 3 Estimated and actual transaction costs for each of the four forest sector carbon sequestration project
case studies
East Africa VCS South America East Africa CDM South East Asia
US$ % US$ % US$ % US$ %
Search costs 0 0 2,256 0.2 0. 0 2,000 0.01
Feasibility studies 44,467 0.3 58,013 4.4 10,480 1.8 18,000 0.07
Negotiation costs 66,079 0.5 30,670 2.3 14,008 2.4 85,000 0.32
Monitoring costs 598,918 4.7 287,517 21.9 240,000 41.8 840,000 3.16
Regulatory approval costs 976,493 7.6 355,264 27.1 288,510 50.2 1,992,000 7.50
Methodology development 0 0 0 0
Preparation of documentation
for validation
53,064 184,859 69,131 50,000
Project validation 55,538 61,510 75,379 42,000
Offset verification 266,319 80,000 144,000 100,000
Registry/program fee 601,573 28,895 0 1,800,000
Insurance costsa 11,153,864 86.6 535,749 40.9 0 0 23,640,000 88.95
Summed costs
Total cost 12,873,947 1,311,256 574,813 26,577,000
Total validation cost 219,147 337,308 168,997 197,000
Total verification cost 12,654,800 932,160 384,000 26,380,000
$/ha 1,190 1,426 270 89
$/t CO2 3.64 7.71 0.09 2.21
a Insurance costs were calculated assuming a carbon price of $7.88 t CO2 (based on weighted average price



















Fig. 2 Comparison across case studies of percentage of total transaction costs in each of the cost categories
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The base scenario, without accounting for transaction costs, generated by the model
(Table 5) is consistent with most other economic analyses and indeed the earlier analysis
conducted with the model used here (see Sohngen 2010). The many studies reviewed in
Richards and Stokes (2004) similarly do not include transactions costs. The C prices that we
used in the analysis were assumed to follow optimal C prices projected by Nordhaus (2008),
they thus rise over time as C accumulates in the atmosphere.
When we reran the model with transaction costs estimated as above, landowners see
lower C prices and they sequester less C (Table 5). Initially, inclusion of transaction costs
reduced C sequestered by about 30 %. This makes sense given that C prices are lower and
the fixed cost component of the transactions cost estimate has a larger effect. Over time as C
prices rise, transaction costs have a smaller effect, mainly because the fixed portion of the
transactions costs becomes a smaller and smaller proportion of the total. Regardless, even
toward the end of the century, the model projects 21 % less C sequestered when transaction
costs are included. These results imply that most studies of C sequestration underestimate
potential C sequestration costs by up to 30 %.
4 Discussion
4.1 Case study findings
We examined four case studies across three continents with areas from less than 1,000 ha to
300,000 ha with between 170,000 and 12 million C credits anticipated. Estimated transac-
tion costs ranged from 0.3 % to 270 % of anticipated income depending principally on the
price of C credits and project size.
The highest relative transaction costs were for the VCS project in South America. This
project encompassed less than 1,000 ha and therefore costs in preparing the project, in
monitoring and in gaining validation and verification are not balanced by large areas in
which sequestration can occur. As a result at an offset price of $8, transaction costs are
estimated at 98 % of income. Even at the currently highly unfeasible price of $30 per ton the































Fig. 3 Comparison across case studies of percentage of total regulatory approval costs in each of the
regulatory approval cost subcategories
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CDM project in East Africa. As a CDM project, guarantee of offset permanence comes from
temporary credits rather than an insurance buffer. However, the use of temporary credits comes
at a cost as such offsets must be replaced and are not fully fungible with permanent offsets in the
way that offsets under a buffer system would be (Brown and Pearson 2009). As a result the
CDMoffsets will likely retail at a fraction of the cost of the offsets achieved under the VCS even
though one is for a compliance market and the other for a voluntary market.
4.2 Impact of transaction costs on C sequestration projects at the global scale
The global scale analysis illustrates that many of the existing estimates of C sequestration costs are
likely underestimated by up to 30 %. These estimates have been made under the assumption that
the fixed costs of sequestration are $1 per ton CO2. If this study underestimates actual transaction
costs then the amount of C sequestered at any given price is likely to be even lower (i.e., the
underestimate is likely to be more than 30 % if actual transactions costs are higher). We do not
believe, however that the fixed costs will increase substantially over time. Given that learning
undoubtedly will occur and given that advances in the technology used for measuring and
monitoring C will also occur, we actually expect these costs to fall.
More importantly, insurance costs represent a large share of total costs. Insurance costs may
ormay not decrease over time. One reasonwhy insurance costs are currently large is that society
has little experience with forest C sequestration activities, and there are strong concerns with
permanence. If society becomes more comfortable with C sequestration activities after seeing
their success, the rationale for maintaining insurance buffers may decline. However, it is also
possible that insurance costs could remain high as C prices rise. As C prices rise, C sequestered
in forests has greater value at risk. With greater value at risk, the rationale for holding insurance
may continue to be important.
Lastly, we note a couple of other limitations in our approach. First, there could be
important differences in transactions costs across regions that are not considered in this
Table 5 Comparison of scenarios of market price and cumulative quantity of CO2 sequestered without and
with accounting for transaction costs in the global forest and land use model
Base scenario Transaction cost scenario
PM (Market price) $/t CO2 Pg CO2 P
L (Landowner price) $/t CO2 Pg CO2 (% reduction from base)
2010 $5.56 27.4 $3.78 18.9 (−30 %)
2020 $12.62 83.8 $8.72 58.1 (−30 %)
2030 $15.89 142.1 $11.23 100.7 (−29 %)
2040 $19.60 202.9 $14.09 147.9 (−27 %)
2050 $23.82 264.3 $17.34 199.2 (−24 %)
2060 $28.60 319.6 $21.02 241.2 (−24 %)
2070 $33.98 364.1 $25.16 273.8 (−24 %)
2080 $40.03 403.5 $29.82 308.0 (−23 %)
2090 $46.81 446.1 $35.04 346.2 (−22 %)
2100 $54.40 493.0 $40.89 388.1 (−21 %)
2110 $62.88 547.3 $47.42 431.1 (−21 %)
Cumulative carbon gains are for the year given and illustrate the change in carbon from the baseline. The total
carbon calculated above includes aboveground and belowground carbon plus carbon stored in harvested wood
products
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analysis. These differences could arise due to a range of factors including governance
structures, legal status, labor rates, and other issues. Regional differences could have
important implications both for regional costs and global costs. We do not have information
sufficient to delineate differences by region, but recognize that it would be important to
gather this information in the future. Second, we model transactions costs as exogenous in
our economic model, while in reality, transactions costs should be endogenous. Market
forces should drive transactions costs down over time, although we have not allowed them to
change. This could be an area of future research.
5 Conclusions
We determined that most existing estimates of marginal costs of C sequestration are
underestimated by up to 30 %, due to a failure to consider transaction costs. At current C
prices our case studies illustrate that transaction costs represent between a third and 100 % of
offset income (excluding the CDM project). Lessons clearly learned are: 1) the importance
of scale, such that significant project areas are needed to ameliorate the fixed element of
transaction costs; and 2) the importance of insurance costs. The dominance of insurance
costs illustrates the need for further work to improve understanding on mitigating risks for
land use C projects.
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